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It may be that a county court has no business overruling estab-
lished law under the Interstate Commerce Act. However, Chris does
point out a very real problem. The public is not aware of the law
of carrier liability, and there is no satisfactory means of discovering
it until one suffers the loss of a piece of baggage at the hands of a
carrier. Judge Finz has pointed out that the carriers have been pro-
tected by law long enough, and that some of this protection should
be removed to promote a greater sense of responsibility and care upon
the "giants who can conquer speed at 35,000 feet but appear to drag
their feet at sea level." 34 Whether higher courts will also impose this
greater burden on common carriers remains to be seen. 35
ROBERT H. DUCKWALL
"IN TIME OF WAR" AND VETERANS' PREFERENCE
"In time of war" is a phrase often used in the legal field to dis-
tinguish between a time of peace and a period of hostilities between
nations. Both declared and undeclared wars have been included within
the phrase,' but a major problem is presented whenever a court must
determine whether or not a period of hostilities constitutes a "time
of war" when Congress has not officially declared war.
The Supreme Court of Colorado recently faced this problem in
Freed v. Baldi2 in the context of veterans' preference in public em-
ployment. A Colorado constitutional clause3 gives preference points
to civil service applicants who have served in the armed forces "in
34Chris v. Greyhound Bus Lines, 57 Misc. 2d 129, 291 N.Y.S.2d 964, 967 (Civ.
Ct. 1968).
"At the time of this writing, no notice of an appeal has been made.
'See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (0oth Cir. 1946); Savage
v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1944).
Colo. -, 43 P.2d 716 (1968).
' In each and every examination held or conducted by the state civil service
commission ... for appointment and employment in and promotions to
offices and places of trust and employment in the classified civil service...
the passing grade for each candidate shall be the same. Five points shall be
added to the grades of candidates receiving a passing grade who served
in the armed forces of the United States in times of war and who were
honorably discharged therefrom .... Ten points shall be added to the grades
of candidates receiving a passing grade who incurred disability in the line
of duty while so serving and who were so discharged.
COLO. CONST. art. 12, § 14.
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times of war."4 Freed's position on the promotion list of the City
and County of Denver Civil Service Commission was challenged on
the ground that the ten veterans' preference points awarded to him
as a result of his military service during the Korean conflict were
illegally awarded since the Korean conflict was not a time of war.
The court, relying heavily on the earlier Colorado case of Pyramid
Life Insurance Company v. Masch,5 concluded that the hostilities in
Korea were not encompassed by the phraseology "in times of war"
because of the absence of an official declaration of war by Congress.
The court further supported its position by noting that the Philippine
Insurrection, an undeclared war, was specifically mentioned by name
in the constitution. The court reasoned that the legislature enumerat-
ed this particular conflict because it meant that undeclared wars
should otherwise not be included within the phrase. Accordingly,
Freed lost his preference points.
Justice Kelley dissented and indicated that "in times of war"
was intended to be used in a generic sense and not the technical
sense employed by the Pyramid case. He asserted that Pyramid was
inapplicable because the considerations presented in interpreting "in
time of war" in insurance contracts are different from those in the
present case. Justice Kelley further stated that the majority failed
to carry out the intent of the people of Colorado in interpreting the
constitutional provision.7
"In time of war" is not confined in use solely to veterans' prefer-
ence legislation, but is a prominent and decisive factor in other areas
of government and law. For example, in the field of insurance law
there has been a split of authority in construing "in time of war."
The phrase is used frequently in double indemnity provisions for
accidental death to limit the insurance company's liability if the
The times of war above referred to are the period of the Spanish-Ameri-
can War; the period of the Philippine Insurrection; the period from
April 6, 1917, to November i, 1918, both dates inclusive; the period from
December 7, 1941, to the date proclaimed by the congress or president of
the United States as the end of the war declared by the United States on
December 8, 1941, both dates inclusive; and the period of any war in
which the United States may hereafter engage. (Emphasis added).
COLO. CONST. art. 12, § 14.
The Colorado Constitution stands alone in its use of "in times of war."
Throughout this comment "in time of war" will be used except when specific
reference to Freed is made. The phrases are interpreted synonomously.
r134 Colo. 70, 299 P.2d 117 (1956).
OChief Justice Moore and Justice Kelley both delivered dissenting opinions.
7443 P.2d at 722.
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insured dies "in time of war."8 Some courts have reasoned that a
"time of war" can only evolve from an official declaration by Con-
gress.9 The leading case using this "constitutional" criterion'0 is West
v. Palmetto State Life Insurance Company," in which the insured was
killed at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, while a member of the
United States Navy. His life insurance policies contained clauses
which stated that the insurer would not be liable for double indemnity
for accidental death if the insured was killed while serving in the
Armed Forces "in time of war." Because Congress did not declare
war on Japan until December 8, 1941,12 the court reasoned that the
attack on Pearl Harbor was not encompassed by the term "in time
of war." Accordingly, the insurance company was held liable for
double indemnity. Another factor in cases using the "constitutional"
criterion is the canon of insurance law which construes the contract
against the insurer and most favorably for the insured.
13
A different interpretation of "in time of war" in insurance cases
was conceived during World War II,14 but it was not until litigation
8Typical exclusionary clauses used by insurance companies are:
The Society agrees, subject to the provisions hereinafter stated, to
increase the amount payable under this policy by a sum equal to the face
amount thereof upon receipt of due proof, as herein required, that...
(4) such death was not the result of or caused by ... (e) war, or service in
any military, naval or air forces of any country at war.
E. PATrERSON AND W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANcE, App. L(l) at
729 (4th ed. 1961).
Risks Not Assumed:-The Company shall not be liable for the addi-
tional Accidental Death Benefit specified above if said death shall result by
reason of any of the following: ... (d) Military, air or naval service in
time of war.
Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202, 204, cert. denied,
346 U.S. 820 (1953).
"Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1944); Rosenau v.
Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944); Harding v. Pennsyl-
vania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 270, 95 A.2d 221, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 812
(1953); Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202, cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25
S.E.2d 475 (1943); Ching Pang v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 37 Hawaii 208 (1945).
'OIt is so called because "in time of war" is held to be a war in the constitu-
tional sense only when it is officially declared by Congress. See Beley v. Pennsyl-
vana Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953).
"202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475 (1943)-
"U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE, at 843 (1941).
"Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944);
Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202, 205, cert. denied,
346 U.S. 820 (1953)-
"See Stinson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1948); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (loth Cir. 1946); Stankus v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N.E.2d 687 (1942).
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arising from the Korean conflict that it became widely accepted. Many
courts'5 began interpreting "in time of war" to include both de-
clared and undeclared wars and thereby found no liability on the
insurer in either case. The reasoning of the courts in adopting this
approach was that the risks contemplated by the contracting parties
were identical in both declared and undeclared wars. 16 To enforce
the liability of the insurer on the ground that Congress had not
officially declared war was thought to place an unnecessarily strict
interpretation upon the words of the insurance contract"7 perhaps
placing an unnecessarily harsh burden on the insurer. Furthermore,
some of these courts reasoned that if legislative action is a necessary
antecedent to war, such action could be found in other kinds of
legislation enacted by Congress designed to further a war-time effort.' 8
Military law is another area where "in time of war" has been sub-
ject to interpretation. The Uniform Code of Military Justice 9 makes
frequent use of the phrase. 20 The Military Court of Appeals has con-
"Gagliormella v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 246 (D. Mass. 1954);
Weissman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Zaccardo
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 76, 124 A.2d 926 (Super. Ct.
1956); Stucker v. College Life Ins. Co. of America, - Ind. App. -, 208 N.E.2d
731 (1965); Langlas v. Iowa Life Ins. Co., 245 Iowa 713, 63 N.V.2d 885 (1954);
Standbery v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 26 N.J. Super. 498, 98 A.2d 134 (Super. Ct. 1953);
Goodrich v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 271, 234 N.Y.S.2d
587 (1962); Shneiderman v. Metropolitan Cas. Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 284, 220 N.Y.S.2d
947 (1961); Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 388 Pa. 499, 131 A.2d 600 (1957);
Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W.2d 554 (1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1954); Christensen v. Sterling Ins. Co., 46 Wash. 2d
713, 284 P.2d 287 (1955); Lynch v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 278 S.W.2d
32 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1955).
"E.g., Langlas v. Iowa Life Ins. Co., 245 Iowa 713, 63 N.W.2d 885, 888 (1954);
Christensen v. Sterling Ins. Co., 46 Wash. 2d 713, 284 P.2d 287 (1955).
"'See Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W.2d
554 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1954).
"nVeissman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1953);
Zaccardo v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2o Conn. Supp. 76, 124 A.2d 926
(Super. Ct. 1956); Langlas v. Iowa Life Ins. Co., 245 Iowa 713, 63 N.W.2d 885
(1954); Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W.2d 554
(1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 938 (1954)-
"0o U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964).
"°Article 2(10) of the U.C.M.J. makes all persons (civilians) serving with or
accompanying an armed force in the field subject to the Code "in time of war."
Article 43(a) suspends the statute of limitations for the offenses of desertion or
absence without leave if committed "in time of war," and Article 43()O() suspends
the statute of limitations for all frauds against the government when the United
States is at war until three years after terminaion of the hostilities. Certain offenses
not punishable as capital are made capital offenses "in time of war": desertion
(art. 85(c)); assaulting or wilfully disobeying a superior commissoned officer (art.
1969]
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sistently included both declared and undeclared wars in defining "in
time of war."21 The leading case in this area is United States v. Ban-
croft22 where the defendant was charged with sleeping on his post
during the Korean hostilities. A special court-martial, which normally
has jurisdiction only over non-capital offenses,23 convicted Bancroft
of the offense. Bancroft argued that only a general court-martial had
jurisdiction because the offense was punishable as capital "in time
of war." The court concluded that reasonableness and practicality
were the most prevailing reasons for determining that the Korean
conflict was a "time of war." Accordingly, the special court-martial
was held to lack jurisdiction. The court considered eight factors in
determining that there was a "time of war": (1) the manner in which
the conflict was being carried out; (2) the movement to, and large
numbers of American men and women on, the battlefields of Korea;
(3) the casualties involved; (4) the sacrifices required; (5) the draft-
ing of recruits to maintain the large number of persons in military
service; (6) the national emergency legislation enacted and being
enacted; (7) the executive order promulgated; and (8) the tremendous
sums expended for the purpose of keeping the Army, Navy, and Air
Force in the Korean theatre of operations. 24 These reasons have most
recently been followed in applying "in time of war" to the hostilities
in Viet Nam for purposes of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
in United States v. Anderson.2 5 Anderson, who had been convicted
of an unauthorized absense, argued that this determination was barred
by the statute of limitations, but the court found that the statute
of limitations was suspended because the United States was "in time
of war."26
go); improper use of countersign (art. 1o); spying (art. io6); and misbehavior of
sentinel (art. 113). For an excellent, in depth study of "in time of war" as applied
to the U.C.M.J., see Stevens, Time of War and Viet Nam, 8 JAG L. REV. 23 (May-
June, 1966).
t United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968) (deser-
tion); United States v. Swain, io U.S.C.M.A. 37, 27 C.M.R. 111 (1958) (fraud);
United States v. Shell, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 23 C.M.R. 110 (1957) (absence without
leave); United States v. Gann, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 12, 11 C.M.R. 12 (1953) (desertion);
United States v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953) (sleeping on post).
123 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953).
'1"[S]pecial courts-martial have jurisdiction to try persons subject to this chap-
ter for any non-capital offense made punishable by -this chapter...." U.C.M.J. art.
ig (Emphasis added).
23 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 5, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953).
217 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968).
21 Chief Judge Quinn concluded that the Gulf of Tonkin Resoluton, passed by
a joint session of Congress on August to, 1964, was a declaration of war by Congress.
He reached this conclusion by looking to the language of the Resolution as well
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No distinction has been drawn between declared and undeclared
wars for the purpose of the Uniform Code of Military Justice because
it appears that discipline and proper control of military affairs is as
much a necessity in an undeclared war as in a declared war.27
Basically, there are three purposes generally said to underlie the
passage of veterans' preference statutes. The federal government, in
passing the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944,28 intended to aid veterans
in rehabilitation and relocation because military service had dis-
rupted their normal modes of life and employment. 29 In passing this
statute, Congress hoped that the states would similarly follow with
as the interpretation of it by the Executive Department, as revealed by the testi-
mony of the Under Secretary of State, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in 1967. Katzenbauch testified that the Administration
regarded the resolution as participation by Congress "in the functional way ...
contemplated by the Founding Fathers" to "invoke the ... war powers." United
States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 590, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968). Judges Kilday
and Ferguson each concurred in the result, but neither regarded the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution as a declaration of war.
The Resolution reads in part as follows:
Sec. i .... Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves
and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief,
to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces
of the United States and to prevent further aggression.
Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to
world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in south-
east Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the
Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, there-
fore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, in-
luding the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense
of its freedom.
Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine
that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international
conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except
that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of Congress.
78 Stat. 384 (1964).
"See generally United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386
(1968); United States v. Ayers, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 15 C.M.R. 220 (1954); United
States v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953)-
"58 Stat. 387 (1944). Sec. 2.
In certification for appointment ... permanent or temporary, and in either
(a) the classified civil service; (b) the unclassified civil service ... preference
shall be given to ... (4) those ex-servicemen and women who have served
on active duty in any branch of the armed forces of the United States, dur-
ing any war, or in any campaign or expedition (for which a campaign
badge has been authorized), and have been separated therefrom under
honorable conditions.
This act was revised by 8o Stat. 401 (1966).
2Mitchell v. Cohen, 333 U.S. 411 (1948).
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their own preference provisions.30 A second purpose for preference
legislation has been to utilize, in public employment, the valuable
qualities and experiences which are possessed by those men and women
who have had military training. Courts have reasoned that, because of
military training and discipline, veterans tend to make superior pub-
lic servants.31 The last purpose expressed for the passage of preference
statutes is founded on the belief that the public owes a measure of
gratitude to those who served in the Armed Forces, and the passage
of preference legislation is an excellent means of fostering patriotism.
3 2
Cases interpreting "in time of war" in the context of preference
statutes are rare.33 The New Jersey Superior Court was called upon
to interpret the New Jersey veterans' preferences statute specifically
in relation to the Korean hostilities in the case of Miele v. McGuire.
34
It was unsuccessfully argued that because various other state prefer-
ence statutes had been amended to include the Korean hostilities,
the omission of Korea in the New Jersey statute could only mean
that it was not intended to be included within the scope of "in time
of war." The court, however, stated that it was just as reasonable
to infer that the legislature believed the wording of the statute broad
enough to encompass veterans of the Korean conflict without the
necessity of amendment. The court further stated that scholastic
strictness of definition could not be adopted if it prevented a reason-
able construction of the statute. Strict construction could not be
allowed to defeat apparent legislative design.35 Thus, one court,
when called upon to interpret "in time of war" in relation to vet-
erans' preference statutes, rejected a restrictive reading of the statute
and founded its result in an effort to effectuate the purposes and de-
w'Private employers and corporations, as well as State, county, and municipal
governments, have been urged through the selective-service law and otherwise to
afford reemployment to veterans when they leave the armd forces." U.S. CODE
CONG. SERVIcE at 1154 (1944)-
31Yates v. Rezeau, 62 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1952); Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer
v. O'Neill, 368 Pa. 269, 83 A.2d 382 (1951), in which the court stated: "We do
not doubt but that the military training received by veterans during the course
of their service renders them superior candidates for public offices of the nature
now under consideration." 83 A.2d at 383 (office of fire department).
nSee State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Comm'n, 139 Conn. 102, 90 A.2d
862 (1952); Valentine v. McDonald, 371 Mich. 138, 123 N.W.2d 227 (1963); Bateman
v. Marsh, 188 Misc. 18g, 64 N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
'Research has revealed only two: Freed v. Baldi, - Colo. -, 443 P.2d 716
(1968) (which is the subject of this comment) and Miele v. McGuire, 53 NJ. Super.
506, 147 A.2d 827 (Super. Ct. 1959), modified, 31 N.J. 339, 157 A.2d 306 (1960).




signs of the statute-to reward military personnel who had risked
their lives in a military conflict.
The majority in Freed, by relying on Pyramid Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Masch,36 relied on a result which was reached in light of the
purposes underlying contracts for life insurance. As Justice Kelley
indicated in his dissent, Pyramid was inapplicable to the present con-
troversy because a result based upon insurance principles is not
necessarily a proper result in relation to veterans' preference statutes. 37
In each of the areas affected by the phrase "in time of war," judicial
interpretation has achieved a result consonant with the purpose under-
lying the use of the phrase. In the area of veterans' preference statutes,
then, courts should, as the New Jersey court has done, endeavor to
achieve a result which is harmonious with the purposes of the passage
of such legislation, rather than one based upon judicial interpretation
of the legislation. If it is determined that the purposes behind veterans'
preference statutes will be served better by limiting their application
to declared wars only, then cases like Freed will be supportable. But,
in relying on an insurance case, Freed showed a total disregard for
the purpose of the legislation with which it was dealing. Hopefully,
this approach will not be followed in the eighteen other states with
preference statutes similar to or identical with the Colorado consti-
tution.3 8
MICHAEL S. COLO
C534 Colo. 70, 299 P.2d 117 (1956).
,Freed v. Baldi, - Colo. -, 443 P.2d 716, 721 (1968).
The same guidelines, in my opinion, should not be applied in in-
terpreting a convenant between all of the people of the state and the
relatively small portion of the people who serve the country in times of
military conflict by whatever name it may be called, as those which are
applied to an insurance contract. The contract is between private citizens;
it is unilaterally prepared, though bilaterally executed. Courts, in general,
construe the terms of contracts of insurance against the company when-
ever an ambiguity exists.
mARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-491 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2319 (Repl. Vol.
1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-224 (Supp. 1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5933
(Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 63bio8b.7 (Smith-Hurd 1967); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 90.320 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-2416 (1966); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 31, § 23 (1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.1191(13) (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 36.220 (1952); NEv. REV. STAT. § 284.260 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2834
(1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-19-01 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 817 (1963);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-11-25 (1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-112 (Rep1. Vol. 1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 16.18 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 15.1-288 (Repl. Vol. 1965).
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